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A NEW PRODUCT FOR THE STATE CORPORATION LAW MARKET: 
AUDIT COMMITTEE CERTIFICATIONS 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
  
 In the swirling corporate governance reforms led by SOX, the SEC, SROs and 
PCAOB, states are playing minor roles at best.  State absence leaves missing a 
potentially critical link in the evolving US corporate governance circle.  The circle is 
drawn as follows: state corporation law charges boards of directors with managing 
corporations and authorizes board committees; SOX charges audit committees with 
certain tasks, including supervising external auditors; the SEC and SROs require audit 
committee characteristics like independence and compel disclosure; and PCAOB now 
requires external auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness.  This last step could 
close the circle except that auditors performing this evaluation generate conflicts with 
state corporation law, conflicts between auditors and audit committees and face other 
limitations.  These conflicts and limitations can be neutralized in an audit committee 
evaluation exercise conducted by newly-created state agencies staffed with experts in 
state corporation law such as retired lawyers and judges or academics.  These newly-
created state agencies could thus square the newly-forming corporate governance circle.   
 
 The paper presents and evaluates this concept.  It reviews the central role audit 
committees play in corporate governance; considers existing mechanisms that promote 
committee effectiveness—state fiduciary duties, SEC-SRO disclosure rules, and 
traditional auditing—noting the limits of each.  It considers PCAOB’s new auditing 
standards requiring auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness, showing both the 
perceived need for such an evaluation and inherent limits on auditor capabilities to 
render this evaluation effectively. This review leads to state agencies as possible 
providers of this evaluation and certification. The paper sketches the outlines for creating 
and running such state agencies.  It then assesses the likelihood that this concept would 
be accepted by various corporate constituents.  Likely supporters include users and 
producers of financial information and the auditing and legal professions.  More 
uncertain is SEC support, given a new model of corporate-governance production in 
which the SEC uses various instrumentalities, like SROs and PCAOB, to federalize 
corporate governance.  State receptivity depends in part upon and is evaluated according 
to rival corporation law production models (a race to the top or bottom; interest group; 
or state versus federal).  The paper concludes by lamenting that in the evolving 
corporate-governance production model, missing links like this one are unlikely to be 
corrected by state or federal law—unless private-sector agents likely to support such 
concepts lobby for them. 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law & Business, Boston College.  © 2004.  All rights reserved.  Thanks to 
Tamar Frankel, David Henry, Renee Jones, Bob Thompson, Rod Ward and Chuck 
Yablon.  This paper was prepared for presentation at the 17th Bi-Annual University of 
Kansas School of Business/Deloitte-Touche Auditing Conference and the University of 
Connecticut Law School Conference on Corporate Governance (both in April 2004). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Audit committees of corporate boards of directors are central to corporate 
governance for many corporations.  Their effectiveness in supervising financial managers 
and overseeing the financial reporting process is important to promote reliable financial 
statements.  This centrality suggests that it is likewise important for investors and others 
to have a basis for justifiable confidence in audit committee effectiveness.  At present, 
there is no such mechanism.  This Article explains why, considers a way states can 
provide it and assesses as low the likelihood that states will do so. 
 
 State corporation law is designed to produce justifiable investor confidence in 
board audit committees through a simple structure: shareholders elect boards of directors 
and state fiduciary duty law requires directors to manage corporations in the best interests 
of shareholders and the corporation.1  The business judgment rule reposes governance 
power in boards to decide whether to use an audit committee, which directors should 
serve on the audit committee, the scope of its duties and how it should operate.2 
 
 Perceived failures in the traditional state corporation law approach led Congress 
to enact federal law mandating a particular approach to audit committees and their role.  
The federal approach includes mandates under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to staff 
audit committees with independent directors and to vest them with power to supervise a 
corporation’s external auditors.3 Other federal requirements impose reporting and 
disclosure obligations under rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) 
and its instrumentalities the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market 
(misleadingly dubbed self-regulatory organizations or SROs).4  
                                                 
1  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003). 
 
2 State corporation law is thus the foundation of corporate governance.  It provides that 
corporations are managed by a board of directors and authorizes, but does not require, the 
board to act through committees.  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2003). 
 
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 776-78; 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)58 & 7201(a)(3).  SOX does not require boards of directors to form an 
audit committee. But without one, the entire board is deemed that committee and is 
subject to requisite federal laws and regulations.  Id. 
 
4 E.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.06-07 (Nov. 
2003); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES §§ 4200(a)(14)-(15) & 4350(c)-(d) (2003).  The 
SROs are not really self-regulatory but are functional instrumentalities of the SEC.  See 
Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State 
Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 968-69 (2003); infra Part V. 
Their listing requirements are not really standards but excruciatingly-specific rules. See 
William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small 
State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); infra note 47. 
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 SOX also created a new audit standard-setting body, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to provide standards governing audits of public 
companies. In a proposed standard, PCAOB proposed to require external auditors to 
review audit committee effectiveness.5 This proposal could be useful, but poses conflicts 
between auditors and audit committees and is difficult to square with state corporation 
law.6  While PCAOB’s final standard retracted, in part, it still requires external auditors 
to consider audit committee effectiveness as part of their overall review of a 
corporation’s internal control over financial reporting.7 
 
 PCAOB’s proposal reveals a hole in the corporate governance system that this 
admixture of state and federal law creates.  Audit committees are central but no one other 
than boards—and, after the fact, shareholders and courts—has power to oversee them.  
All SOX does is mandate characteristics and functions; all the SEC and SROs do is 
mandate characteristics, reports and disclosure.  All PCAOB ended up doing—after 
flagging the issue of audit committee review—is requiring auditors to include an audit 
committee review as part of the auditor’s more general assessment of a company’s 
internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 The resulting corporate governance system reveals two major problems that this 
paper considers.  The first is the tension between state and federal law.  State corporation 
law trusts boards of directors to choose the right set of management tools for a 
corporation.  Federal law now provides governmental mandates specifying parameters of 
the audit function, whether or not a board believes it is necessary.  But neither alone is 
complete and, even when combined, remains incomplete.  
 
 While the federal regime specifies audit committee composition and function, it 
respects federalism limits by not further specifying how that committee’s effectiveness is 
                                                 
5 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), A PROPOSED STANDARD 
CONCERNING AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter 
PCAOB’s Proposed Standard]. 
 
6 See Part II, infra. 
 
7 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD 
NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004), ¶¶ 55-59 
[hereinafter Auditing Standard No. 2].  [Note: This auditing standard is subject to SEC 
approval, expected easily given SEC’s substantial role in the preparation process.] 
PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 2 to require external auditors to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight of a corporation’s financial reporting and 
related internal control.  This evaluation will be part of the auditor’s new task, under 
SOX, of attesting to managerial assertions concerning the effectiveness of internal 
control. When Auditing Standard No. 2 was released for public comment as a proposed 
standard, the proposal appeared to require a separate and complete evaluation. 
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to be evaluated; while state corporation law provides a framework for this evaluation, it 
does not provide any mechanism to conduct ongoing review. This missing link creates an 
opportunity for states to contribute meaningfully to discussions of corporate governance 
reform SOX prompted. 
 
 As Congress, the SEC, SROs and PCAOB—along with hundreds of assorted 
professionals—have developed a range of policies, proposals and ideas, Delaware and 
other states have stayed on the sidelines (apart from perceived adjustments in their 
approach to the common law of fiduciary obligation).8  States interested in retaining and 
attracting corporate chartering business, from Delaware to Nevada, have a golden 
opportunity here: to provide a mechanism for a mandatory or optional audit committee 
evaluation and effectiveness certification.9   
 
 The second problem concerns how to monitor the monitors.  The federally-
prescribed audit committee is directed to supervise the external auditor and PCAOB 
proposed to have the external auditor evaluate the audit committee.  While such 360-
degree evaluations can work, the proposal is both jarring and difficult to square with state 
corporation law. It remains jarring and difficult to square with state corporation law even 
in the more modest form of having auditors review audit committee effectiveness as part 
of the auditor’s overall review of internal control. 
 
 To address these two problems, this Article considers a state-agency based 
approach to audit committee evaluation.10    A branch of state government could be 
vested with power to conduct a periodic evaluation and provide certification; this could 
be made mandatory or optional. If made optional, corporations could signal to investors a 
higher level of confidence in the integrity of their audit committees. This signal could be 
conveyed in how a state’s corporations are denominated. In Delaware, for example, 
corporations opting out would continue to be called “Delaware corporations;” those 
opting in would enjoy the boosted designation “certified Delaware corporation.” 
 
 The state-agency approach would avoid many of the thorny problems of having 
auditors evaluate audit committees.  It would eliminate conflicts of interest between 
auditors and audit committees and give responsibility to those possessing requisite 
                                                 
8  See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 
29 J. CORP. L. ___ (forthcoming 2004).  
9  Delaware is the country’s leading state of incorporation for large companies. Some see 
Nevada as attempting to compete with Delaware.  E.g., Dave Berns, Shareholders win 
ITT Decision: Will Judge Pro’s Decision Help Nevada Become the “Delaware of the 
West”?, 5 NEVADA LAWYER 22 (Dec. 1997). 
10 Other approaches are possible.  For example, state corporation law statutes could be 
amended to require boards of directors periodically to evaluate and certify their audit 
committees as effective; these amendments could make the exercise mandatory or 
optional (an opt-out based on a shareholder vote for example). 
 
 5
expertise using objective criteria.  It would also create a mechanism furnishing publicly-
disclosed affirmative assurance, in contrast to the more opaque, negative assurance that 
PCAOB’s approach would enable auditors to provide when opining on a company’s 
internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 The state-agency approach has limits.  Some see SOX’s partial federalization of 
corporate governance as rejecting the existing state law system of audit committee 
oversight of auditors and auditor oversight of audit committees and management.  If so, 
the state agency concept can be criticized as simply a return or reenactment of that weak 
world.  On the other hand, the SOX approach is incomplete, respecting some federalism 
limits.  Accordingly, states retain a significant role in corporate governance and a 
mechanism such as a state-agency audit committee evaluation function could help them 
play it—and could even lead to reinvigorating traditional conceptions of fiduciary 
obligation. 
 
 Despite likely appeal of the concept to users and preparers of financial statements 
documented in Part IV below, the concept is not likely to be adopted by many states (or 
any) absent substantial encouragement from those constituents. Regulators, including 
PCAOB and the SEC, may also be less than receptive to the concept.  PCAOB projects 
itself as an additional source of corporate governance.  It will have territorial interests in 
maximizing its regulatory reach.  The SEC, which oversees PCAOB, may wish to 
preserve maximum power in PCAOB as an additional means for its own ability to control 
corporate governance, as it does using SROs, without direct encroachment on state 
corporation law.11 
 
 Apart from uncertain regulatory support, states also may lack incentives to pursue 
the concept.  Predictions of state inclinations regarding this concept depend on adopting 
one of several rival theories of state corporation law production: states compete with each 
other in a race to the top or bottom; they compete to benefit interest groups such as 
lawyers and investment bankers; they compete against the federal government; or they 
comprise one component of a multi-pronged model involving state, federal and SRO 
sources.12   
 
 If the race is to the bottom, states likely will reject the concept, but if to the top or 
to help interest groups, they might accept it.  Under the more complex models, 
predictions are more difficult.  However, it appears that the SEC is developing an 
elaborate method of creating corporate governance using instrumentalities such as SROs 
and PCAOB and may prefer using these arms over which it has direct statutory power, 
rather than states over which it holds only indirect power. States facing even this indirect 
SEC pressure may be reluctant to innovate corporate governance reforms the SEC would 
disfavor, even if they are in the best interests of corporations, investors and the public.  
This is one price of the increasing functional federalization of corporate governance. 
                                                 
11   See Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance, supra, note 4, at 968-69. 
  
12   See Part V, infra. 
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 This Article (I) assesses the need for any formal evaluation of audit committee 
effectiveness in light of existing alternatives providing assurance; (II) reviews PCAOB’s 
standard for auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness to show how its limits 
point directly to creating state mechanisms for this function; (III) sketches the outlines of 
such a program’s design and administration; (IV) draws from public comments made on 
PCAOB’s proposed standard to suggest that a state-agency approach would garner 
widespread support from investors and managers and from the auditing and legal 
professions; and (V) concludes by lamenting that despite virtues and probable field 
support, regulators and states may not support the concept. 
 
 
I.  NEED AND PARTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
 The audit committee plays a central role in overseeing management, financial 
reporting and internal control over financial reporting, among other duties. Effective 
audit committees can be important components of corporate governance, by aiding in 
deterring, detecting and preventing fraudulent financial reporting and thus protecting 
investors and other constituents.  In addition, investors benefit from an understanding of 
audit committee roles in general and within particular organizations.  Although these 
propositions are uncontroversial, an unresolved issue is how best to promote 
understanding and effectiveness. A combination of substantive duties, disclosure rules 
and independent assurance is desirable—much of which is in place. 
 
A.  Existing Substantive Duties 
 
 Longstanding principles of state corporation law provide that boards of directors 
manage the business and affairs of a corporation as fiduciaries.13  Audit committee 
members are members of the board of directors.  As such, they are obliged to discharge 
state corporation law’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, subject to deference under the 
business judgment rule.  Duties include assuring a corporation’s compliance with 
applicable law.  Breach of these duties exposes directors to liability to shareholders in 
private litigation, subject to state law provisions authorizing corporate charters to 
exculpate them from personal liability in certain cases.14  These principles provide a 
measure of discipline on audit committee members in performing their duties.  But given 
the business judgment rule and the prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions, critics 
regard this arrangement as insufficient.   
 
 
                                                 
13 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2003); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 
14 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003) (for money damages for breaches of the 
duty of care, but not for injunctive relief or for breaches of the duty of loyalty or acts not 
taken in good faith); ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 2.02(b)(4)(1990) (similar, but 
without the limitations for breaches of duty of loyalty or good faith). 
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B.  Existing Disclosure Rules 
 
 SRO rules address the disclosure aspect of audit committee functions. These rules 
require that audit committees have a charter, disclose it publicly, evaluate its own 
performance, affirm charter compliance and report on these matters to the full board of 
directors and to the SRO.15  These rules seek to impose accountability and discipline on 
audit committees. The charter-and-disclosure components also provide investors and 
gatekeepers with sources to understand audit committee operations.  Whether these 
requirements are sufficient to assure audit committee effectiveness is not entirely clear.  
An independent evaluation and certification would provide valuable additional 
assurances. 
 
C.  Existing Audit Practice 
 
 Who might provide such assurances? The auditor is a logical choice, in part, 
because it also needs such an understanding to conduct its primary audit functions.  Thus 
an existing solution is traditional audit practice. Auditors conducting traditional financial 
statement audits apply tests of internal controls to help plan the scope of their audits.  
This probing typically includes some dealing with the audit committee.  Many financial 
calamities that brewed during the late 1990s are attributed to internal control failure, 
however, including within audit committees.  These audit failures cast doubt on the 
reliability of traditional audit practice to provide requisite assurances. 
 
D.  Audits of Internal Control 
 
 Responding to these audit failures, SOX directed PCAOB to develop auditing 
standards concerning attestations of managerial assertions of internal control 
effectiveness.16  A key feature of the attestation process requires auditors to assess the 
effectiveness of audit committee oversight concerning internal control over financial 
reporting.  The chief justification for this assessment is the central role that audit 
committees play in financial reporting.   
 
 PCOAB proposed a standard providing for such an auditor assessment of audit 
committee effectiveness.  For reasons considered in the next section, however, PCAOB’s 
final standard (Auditing Standard No. 2) retracted from this full assessment in favor of a 
partial assessment as a component of the auditor’s more general audit of internal control 
over financial reporting.    
 
                                                 
15  NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.06-07 (Nov. 4, 
2003); NASDAQ By-Laws, Art. 9, § 5; NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, §§ 
4200(a)(14)-(15) & 4350(c)-(d) (2003). 
 
16 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 404(b) & 103(a)(2)(A); Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
at ___. 
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 A significant consequence of the difference between PCAOB’s proposed and final 
standards concerns transparency.  As a separate evaluation, the proposed standard 
appeared designed to produce disclosure concerning an audit committee’s effectiveness, 
to provide a form of positive assurance to users of financial statements.  As a mere 
component of the auditor’s overall evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, 
it becomes opaque, less visible to financial statement users.  It is a form of negative 
assurance: that the auditor did not find the audit committee ineffective.17  
 
 This difference minimizes some of the difficulties associated with auditors 
performing this function, including conflicts, expertise and objectivity discussed next.  It 
opens the question of whether audit committee evaluation assignments that auditors are 
institutionally incapable of performing should be performed by another party.  
 
   
II. INHERENT LIMITS OF THE AUDITOR EVALUATION 
 
 PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to evaluate audit committee 
effectiveness in overseeing external financial reporting and internal control over financial 
reporting.  This raises questions concerning the relationship of this exercise to state 
corporation law’s requirement that boards perform this function (a duty SRO listing 
standards restate). It also creates conflicts between the auditor and the audit committee, 
which SOX anoints as the auditor’s supervisor.  PCAOB’s proposed standard elicited 
criticism along these lines;18 Auditing Standard No. 2 responds by emphasizing that (1) it 
does not intend to supplant the board’s responsibilities; (2) the auditor’s evaluation is not 
separate or distinct but part of its control environment assessment; and (3) conflicts are 
inevitable.  These responses leave open major issues concerning inherent limits of the 
auditor evaluation exercise and invite considering alternative providers of audit 
committee evaluation services. 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 provides that auditors evaluating audit committees assess 
committee member independence.  This raises questions concerning whether auditors 
possess requisite expertise to make what are essentially legal judgments.  PCAOB’s 
proposed standard directed auditors to evaluate audit committee compliance with 
requirements of SOX, the SEC and SROs; Auditing Standard No. 2 deleted these 
provisions in response to criticism that they are beyond an auditor’s expertise.  This 
raises questions concerning whether these elements are important for evaluating audit 
committee effectiveness and, if so, also indicates need to consider alternative service 
providers.  Auditing Standard No. 2 specifies a variety of other factors relevant to the 
evaluation, none of which lends itself to measurement by objective criteria usually used 
in auditing.  This raises both sorts of questions: whether auditors possess requisite 
                                                 
17  Auditing Standard No. 2 triggers public disclosure of ineffective audit committee 
oversight only when this amounts to a “material weakness” in internal control over 
financial reporting.  Auditing Standard No. 2, at ¶ 59.  See infra note 30. 
 
18   See Part IV, infra. 
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expertise and whether alternative providers of audit committee evaluations should be 
sought. 
 
A.  Conflicts 
 
 Two classes of conflicts arise from having auditors evaluate audit committee 
effectiveness: (1) legal conflicts between Auditing Standard No. 2 and various laws and 
(2) structural conflicts between auditors and audit committees and between management 
and audit committees.  
 
 1.  Legal.  —   Auditing Standard No. 2’s audit committee evaluation provisions 
can interfere with the allocation of responsibilities established under state corporation law 
and SOX.  Under state law, boards of directors must manage the business and affairs of a 
corporation; under SOX, audit committees must discharge the board-oversight duty 
concerning the external auditor’s qualifications and performance.  
 
 SOX’s approach was designed to correct for the conflict between auditors and 
managers that could be seen as a systemic weakness (auditors became beholden to 
management and softened their professional skepticism).  The evaluation role Auditing 
Standard No. 2 assigns to auditors puts them in the position of evaluating the audit 
committee, an organ of the board of directors.  This can be seen to reintroduce the 
conflict in a different guise.  It thus may be seen to conflict with the goals of those laws.   
 
 The nature of audit committee oversight adds to legal conflicts.  Consider the 
nature of director obligations under state corporation law compared with professional 
techniques auditors are trained to apply.  Directors have fiduciary duties to their 
corporations and stockholders.  They must act in their best interests when discharging 
statutory responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of a corporation.  A well-
developed body of common law applies.  Doctrines include the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care, along with the business judgment rule.  These doctrines provide a judicial 
framework allowing directors leeway to exercise business judgment, while keeping 
behavior within acceptable boundaries.19   
 
 In contrast to judicial approaches to supervising directors, auditors use 
professional skepticism in their tasks, routinely second-guessing management decisions.20 
This approach, when applied to audit committee evaluations, threatens to alter audit 
committee behavior: from that contemplated under state corporation law with deference 
to business judgments into a more rule-oriented and constricting arrangement perhaps not 
                                                 
19  Commentators disagree concerning whether state corporation law draws the boundaries 
faithfully to legitimate norms.  Despite disagreement, there is no question that the auditor 
review would apply a fundamentally different approach. 
 
20 E.g., VINCENT M. O’REILLY, ET AL., MONTGOMERY’S AUDITING (12th ed. 1998), at 4.5 
(due professional care of auditors requires the auditor to exercise professional 
skepticism). 
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in the best interest of a corporation or its shareholders.21  It could lead to highly 
disruptive and unnecessary disagreements.  Hence Auditing Standard No. 2 is somewhat 
at odds with state corporation law.22 
 
 Consider also the different standards of legal obligation owed by directors 
compared to auditors.  When acting through audit committees, these state corporation law 
fiduciary duties remain applicable to directors.  Auditors are not fiduciaries for their 
clients or client stockholders.  At best, law requires auditors to act professionally and not 
to commit negligence or fraud.23  They are contract parties, not fiduciaries.  Having 
contract parties supervise fiduciaries turns a traditional legal hierarchy upside-down.  It 
creates an incoherent corporate governance system. 
 
 Obligations of directors and auditors under federal securities laws differ as well.  
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,24 for example, both are entitled to assert 
due diligence defenses to defeat claims of negligence in discharging their 
responsibilities.25  However, directors are responsible for the entire contents of a 
registration statement and exposed to related liability; auditors are subject to liability only 
for those portions of the registration statement they are responsible for preparing as 
experts.26 
                                                 
21 See generally William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
Versus Standards Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (assessing limits of SOX-
inspired regulatory urge to develop standards-based accounting concepts as opposed to 
rules-based concepts to constrain managerial and auditor rent-seeking). 
 
22  SOX interferes with state corporation law on specific subjects. For example, it bans 
loans to corporate insiders and authorizes federalized derivative lawsuits to recover 
profits generated in violation of new blackout rules. SOX, §§ 306, 402.  But it does not 
purport to alter state corporation law’s charge that directors manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation or preempt the business judgment rule. Congress may have the 
prerogative to take these steps; PCAOB does not. 
 
23 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (discussing scienter 
standard and due diligence defense); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 
(1983) (adopting preponderance of evidence standard rather than clear and convincing 
standard); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing 
negligence standard and requirements of pleading fraud with particularity). 
 
24  15 U.S.C. § 77(k). 
 
25  E.g., Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(reviewing and rejecting asserted due diligence defenses under Section 11 made by 
various corporate officers and directors and the corporation’s external auditor). 
 
26 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-08 (1976): 
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 Auditing Standard No. 2 grapples with these challenges in limited ways.  First, it 
implores auditors to recognize that boards are responsible for evaluating the performance 
and effectiveness of audit committees.27  This is of course an obvious statement of law, 
fact, and authority that PCAOB cannot change.  Second, Auditing Standard No. 2 
declares that it “does not suggest” that auditors are responsible for performing a “separate 
and distinct” audit committee evaluation.28 Equally important, however, it emphasizes 
that auditors assess committee effectiveness because of the central role audit committees 
play in a corporation’s control environment.29   
 
 These provisions are helpful in minimizing conflicts between Auditing Standard 
No. 2 and state corporation law; they do not eliminate them.  Suppose a board makes a 
business judgment not to appoint a financial expert to the audit committee (optional 
under SOX and SRO listing standards and permitted by state corporation law), and makes 
a legal judgment concerning how and when to disclose this (required by SOX).  But 
suppose the auditor disagrees with both conclusions.  What happens?   
 
 In a traditional audit of financial statements, similar disagreements are resolved 
simply: the board’s judgments control.  The auditor uses its opinion when planning the 
scope of its audit—typically one of broader scope than if it concurred in the board’s 
judgments.  In an audit of internal control over financial reporting, however, additional 
processes follow.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Section 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private right 
of action for damages when a registration statement includes untrue 
statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. . . .[E]xperts such as 
accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are 
accorded a ‘due diligence’ defense.  In effect, this is a negligence 
standard.  An expert may avoid civil liability with respect to the portions 
of the registration statement for which he was responsible by showing that 
‘after reasonable investigation’ he had ‘reasonable ground[s]’ to believe 
that the statements for which he was responsible were true and there was 
no omission of a material fact. 
 
27 Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56; see also Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E ¶ E69 
(explaining PCAOB’s conclusion that the standard should explicitly acknowledge that the 
board of directors is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the audit committee 
and that the auditor’s evaluation of the control environment is not intended to supplant 
those evaluations). 
 
28  Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56; see also PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING 
STANDARD NO. 2, at 20-21 (explaining the same point). 
 
29 Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 56. 
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 The auditor must come to an opinion on internal control over financial reporting.  
If it concludes that these judgments amount to an ineffective audit committee, Auditing 
Standard No. 2 instructs it to consider this, at minimum, a significant deficiency and 
perhaps a material weakness.30  These requirements can constrain an auditor to issue an 
adverse opinion on internal control over financial reporting.  In this circumstance, 
directors will feel pressure to submit to the auditor’s opinion rather than exercise their 
own judgment. 
 
 2.  Structural.  —   Under SOX § 301 and implementing measures of the SEC and 
the SROs, listed company audit committees are directly responsible for appointing, 
compensating, and overseeing the work of the company’s external auditors.  This 
investment of power in the audit committee presents a structural conflict with Auditing 
Standard No. 2’s mandate that auditors evaluate audit committee effectiveness. 
 
 The body directly responsible for appointing and determining compensation of the 
auditors, and overseeing their work, is subject, in turn, to that auditors’ scrutiny as part of 
its audit of internal control over financial reporting.   A committee so supervising an 
auditor, charged with evaluating the committee, can be impaired in performing its duties; 
an auditor charged with evaluating the committee’s effectiveness, in its supervisory and 
other tasks, can be impaired in performing this evaluation and its other work.   
 
 The circular approach can violate the independence concept at the foundation of 
auditing.  Auditors are not independent if they act in a managerial capacity.  A formal 
assessment of audit committee effectiveness is a management role, a board responsibility.  
                                                 
30 Id., ¶¶ 59 & 140.   Auditing Standard No. 2 defines the central concepts as follows: 
 
 A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to 
initiate, authorize, record, process or report external financial data reliably 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that 
there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the 
company’s annual or interim financial statements that is more than 
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected. 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 9. 
 
 A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a 
material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 10. 
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Even when the evaluation is described as part of the auditor’s overall assessment of a 
corporation’s control environment, this raises issues of independence impairment in fact 
and in appearance. This violates longstanding principles of federal law expressed by the 
Supreme Court, specific SEC rules, and voluminous professional auditing literature 
defining generally accepted auditing standards.31 
 
 Not all such 360-degreee reviews are inherently suspect. Many managerial review 
exercises at major corporations are conducted in precisely this manner. But given the 
central function of auditors and audit committees in the financial reporting process, any 
structures that may deter frank assessments should be resisted.   Moreover, devices that 
may tend to weaken an audit committee should be resisted.  When auditors are vested 
with implicit directive power over board audit committees, this dilutes a board’s similar 
power, which may have the effect of diminishing an audit committee’s effectiveness.   
 
 If an auditor’s evaluation of audit committee effectiveness is memorialized in 
audit opinions, moreover, consideration would be necessary concerning whether 
management would also have to formally evaluate the audit committee.  This multiplies 
conflicts. A technical case can be made that when audit committees are part of an 
auditors’ formal scope of review, they would likewise be within management’s formal 
scope of review.32  If so, managers would become obligated to evaluate audit committees.  
But audit committees are typically charged with evaluating management. So an additional 
conflict arises where management is reviewing the audit committee and vice versa. 
 
 A more severe problem arises.  If managers must evaluate the audit committee, 
auditors will seek to rely on management’s evaluation in preparing their own evaluation 
or reevaluation.  This adds yet another circularity problem where auditors rely on 
management.  The result is a series of tangled circles studded with conflicts that risk 
undermining the systemic utility of both auditors and audit committees. 
 
                                                 
31 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RULE 2-01 OF REGULATION S-X, § 
210.2-01 (“Rule 2-01 is designed to ensure that auditors are qualified and independent of 
their audit clients both in fact and in appearance”) (emphasis added); see also 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FINAL RULE: REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RULES, RELEASE NOS. 33-7919 & 34-43602, at notes 38-39 
(citing numerous sources that emphasize requirement of the appearance of auditor 
independence, including professional auditing literature and legal precedents like United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984)). 
 
32 The technical case would run as follows.  Under Auditing Standard No. 2, an 
ineffective audit committee is a significant deficiency.  This in turn is a strong indicator 
of a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting.  In such cases, 
management must review and address the issue to make its own internal control 
assessment adequate. This would imply that management would have to review the audit 
committee in order for the auditor to furnish an unqualified control audit opinion.  
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 PCAOB addresses these concerns obliquely.  Its key structural response is to 
emphasize that the auditor’s evaluation of the audit committee is “not a separate 
evaluation” but part of evaluating the control environment and monitoring components of 
internal control over financial reporting.33  It opined that this would partially address the 
structural conflict and that the part unaddressed is simply inherent in professional 
auditing.34   
 
 PCAOB’s release accompanying Auditing Standard No. 2 sought to minimize 
conflict concerns.  It opined that “Normally, the auditor’s interest and the audit 
committee’s interests will be aligned” in pursuing fair financial statements and effective 
control and auditing.35  It characterized the conflict between SOX § 301 and Auditing 
Standard No. 2 as “theoretical.”36  PCAOB appealed to auditing custom and investor 
knowledge, saying “experienced auditors are accustomed to bearing” such conflicts and 
“that investors expect an auditor to address” them.37 
 
 Accordingly, PCAOB does not ultimately resolve the conflict, but says instead 
that it is inevitable, auditors are used to operating with such conflicts, and investors are 
okay with this.  This result creates deep tension with fundamental concepts of auditor 
independence and the heavy stress SEC regulations and SOX place on auditor 
independence.  Despite its efforts, PCAOB does not adequately respond to these 
concerns.  An additional or alternative mechanism that avoids these fundamental 
problems thus remains appealing. 
 
B.  Expertise 
 
 Two additional concerns relate to whether auditors possess requisite expertise to 
comply with Auditing Standard No. 2’s requirement that they evaluate audit committee 
effectiveness as part of assessing the control environment.  The first is whether auditors 
possess necessary knowledge concerning the legal concept of independence, which 
Auditing Standard No. 2 states auditors assess in this evaluation.  The second involves 
audit committee compliance with SOX, SEC and SRO requirements, which PCAOB’s 
proposed standard required auditors to assess but which Auditing Standard No. 2 deletes.  
The deletion solves one question and raises another: auditors are not directed to reach 
                                                 
33 Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E66. 
 
34 Id. (explaining that emphasizing the context of the auditor’s evaluation would “address, 
to some extent, the conflict-of-interest concerns” but that the conflict “is, to some extent, 
inherent in the duties that society expects of auditors.”).  
 
35   PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 21. 
 
36   Id. 
 
37  Id. 
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legal conclusions concerning compliance, but are these conclusions in fact necessary to 
form opinions concerning audit committee effectiveness?  
 
 1.  Independence.  —  PCAOB’s proposed standard stated that auditors should 
evaluate committee member independence, along with evaluating the independence of 
their nomination, selection and action.38  Auditing Standard No. 2 retains a provision 
concerning evaluating member independence, but deletes the latter more detailed 
provisions without explanation. It likewise dropped without explanation a statement to 
the effect that the more independent the nominating process, the more independent a 
committee is likely to be.39 
 
 Identifying PCAOB’s reasons for the deletions requires speculation.  Reasons 
may include concerns that assessing the independence of a nomination or selection 
process or of director action involves judgments concerning corporate governance and 
law beyond an auditor’s expertise.40 SRO listing standards require boards to determine 
the independence of each outside director, using specific criteria under those standards 
supplemented by general principles rooted in state corporation law.41  Establishing links 
between the independence of the nomination and selection process and member 
independence is difficult. It is likewise a matter of corporate governance and legal 
judgment.  Determinations are made with reference to state corporation law, SOX § 301, 
SEC regulations, and SRO listing standards, all likely beyond an auditor’s expertise.42 
 
 If the reason PCAOB deleted the supplemental requirements concerned expertise 
and matters of law, it is difficult to justify retaining the factor calling for auditors to 
                                                 
38 Proposed Standard, ¶ 58. 
 
39 Id. 
 
40  Supporting this guess are some comment letters on PCAOB’s Proposed Standard, 
including those provided by some auditing firms, as discussed in Part IV, infra.  
 
41  NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (Nov. 4, 2003); 
NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, § 4350 (2003). 
 
42   Another possible reason for the deletion is that SEC rules also require corporations to 
disclose nominating committee processes. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
FINAL RULE: DISCLOSURE REGARDING NOMINATING COMMITTEE FUNCTIONS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY HOLDERS AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, RELEASE 
NOS. 33-8340 & 34-48825 (Nov. 24, 2003).  However, if this justifies deleting 
nomination-selection process independence from an auditing standard, it suggests 
PCAOB serves as more than an auditing standard-setter.  It is a component of an SEC-
directed regulatory regime combining various instruments including disclosure.  See Part 
V, infra. 
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evaluate the “independence of the audit committee members from management.”43  This 
is likewise a question of law and corporate governance, not auditing.   
 
 In fact, the appearance and use of this factor in Auditing Standard No. 2 are 
driven entirely by legal rules.  This is clear from the following note contained in Auditing 
Standard No. 2, stating that companies whose securities are not listed: 
 
 may not be required to have independent directors for their audit 
committees [and that] the auditor should not consider the lack of 
independent directors at these companies indicative, by itself, of a control 
deficiency.44 
 
 The purpose of the note is clear and accurate: when not required by listing 
standards, absence of independent directors is not alone a control deficiency.  The 
negative implication is less clear and possibly wrong: when required by listing standards, 
absence of directors is alone a control deficiency.  Whether this negative implication is 
correct is a legal question.  The issue is whether an audit committee’s role and relative 
effectiveness varies with exchange listings and related requirements.  That, in turn, 
depends on the purpose and meaning of the relevant requirements, including in this 
context the independence concept.  The purpose and meaning of legal concepts, including 
the concept of director independence, are questions requiring legal analysis and 
interpretation. 
 
 Relative to auditing, moreover, why should lack of independent directors indicate 
a control deficiency?  The foregoing note implies that the presence or absence of 
independent directors is not relevant to internal control, much less to an auditor’s 
assessment of audit committee effectiveness. Rather, for listed companies, the issue is 
whether they are in compliance with listing standards, not whether that compliance 
promotes committee effectiveness. The directive that auditors evaluate audit committee 
member independence is therefore also fundamentally a matter of complying with those 
listing standards imposing the requirement.   
 
 It is not possible to escape the fact that auditor evaluations of these characteristics 
are therefore legal judgments, not auditing judgments.45 In any event, these challenges 
indicate, again, that a search may be warranted to find alternative or additional providers 
of audit committee evaluation and certification services.46 
                                                 
43 Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 57. 
 
44 Id. 
 
45 This view strengthens the suggestion noted above (in note 42) that PCAOB is operating 
as a component in a complex web of federal regulation being directed by the SEC rather 
than as an independent auditing standard setter.  See Part V, infra. 
 
46 Another inherent limit appears.  When auditors render opinions concerning audit 
committee effectiveness that involve legal expertise, they risk violating state laws 
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 2.  Compliance.  —  Independent audit committee members are required by SRO 
listing standards.  While Auditing Standard No. 2 retains provisions directing auditors to 
assess this factor, it deleted two other provisions expressly requiring auditors to evaluate 
compliance with law and regulation, including SRO listing standards.  The deleted 
provisions directed auditors to assess audit committee compliance with the excruciatingly 
detailed SRO listing standards under SOX § 301 and whether an audit committee 
included a financial expert (called an audit committee financial expert or ACFE) as 
contemplated under SOX § 407.47  Materials accompanying Auditing Standard No. 2 
indicated three reasons for these deletions, as follows: 
 
The factors that addressed compliance with listing standards and sections 
of [SOX] were deleted, because those factors were specifically criticized 
in comment letters as being either [1] outside the scope of the auditor’s 
expertise or [2] outside the scope of internal control over financial 
reporting [and PCAOB believed] that [3] those factors were not significant 
to the type of evaluation the auditor was expected to make of the audit 
committee.48 
 
Explanation [1] is easy to accept; the other two raise additional issues. 
 
 Concerning the first explanation, consider that audit committees must comply 
with various SRO listing standards and judge applicable best-practice guidelines 
                                                                                                                                                 
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.  Cf. Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, 
LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136) (advising that when financial 
statement preparers lack guidance for SOX § 404 compliance they turn to auditors and “It 
is possible that auditors providing this guidance might be misconstrued as providing legal 
advice . . . .”).  Auditors doing so pursuant to Auditing Standard No. 2 generate an 
additional bundle of clashes.  Issues include the relationship between state law governing 
the legal profession and prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law on the one hand and 
the exact juridical status of PCAOB on the other.  Compare Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 2 
(noting that the standard summarizes legal requirements to provide context and 
understanding, not to interpret them). 
 
47   PCAOB Proposed Standard, ¶ 57.  SOX § 301 directed the SEC to direct the SROs to 
adopt various corporate governance standards as listing requirements, which the SROs 
have done.  Resulting listing standards, including for example the New York Stock 
Exchange’s Section 303.A.00, specify such minutia as audit committees must have at 
least three members and such procedures as audit committees having charters containing 
specified details.  SROs traditionally described their listed company manuals as 
containing “listing standards,” accurate in the pre-federalization era and a misnomer now 
that these manuals are laden with dense, excruciatingly-detailed provisions bearing no 
resemblance to the concept of “standards.” 
 
48 Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E68. 
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established by SROs, the SEC and other engines of corporate governance.  Whether a 
committee complies with SRO listing standards is a legal judgment and whether a board 
of directors opts to have its audit committee adhere to formally-articulated best practices 
is a business judgment. 
 
 Consider again SOX’s provision concerning including an audit committee 
financial expert (ACFE).  Rules permit, but do not require, this feature and provide that a 
board opting not to include an ACFE disclose reasons.  Whether to include an ACFE is 
essentially a matter of business judgment.  Issues include whether that expertise is 
necessary and whether relevant SEC standards are appropriate for the corporation.  
Auditors are not in a position to assess this business judgment. 
 
 Rules requiring disclosing whether audit committees include an ACFE are 
essentially legal rules.  The remedy for failure to comply is delisting, and possibly other 
sanctions.  These are legal results posing business consequences.  They are not elements 
within the auditor’s purview, which is concerned ultimately with fair financial reporting 
and indirectly with effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 PCAOB’s second and third justifications for deleting compliance assessment 
factors are more difficult to understand and interpret.  If these are “outside the scope of 
internal control over financial reporting” and “not significant” to the auditor’s evaluation, 
why were they included in PCAOB’s proposed standard? A possible reason is that 
PCAOB’s proposed standard envisioned an auditor evaluation that was “separate and 
distinct” and encompassed review beyond effectiveness concerning internal control over 
financial reporting.  The review contemplated by Auditing Standard No. 2 is narrower.  
This explanation may be satisfactory in terms of understanding and applying Auditing 
Standard No. 2 as an auditing standard.  
 
 But PCAOB’s explanation is unclear.  It bases its conclusion in part on comment 
letters critical of the concept as either beyond an auditor’s expertise or outside the scope 
of internal control over financial reporting; it separately states its opinion that these are 
not significant to the auditor’s expected evaluation.  It leaves unclear whether PCAOB 
believes they are outside the scope of internal control over financial reporting and leaves 
unexplained why they are not significant.49   
 
 Whatever weight one assigns to the relative significance of compliance as a 
measure of audit committee effectiveness regarding internal control over financial 
reporting, what is clear is that PCAOB is directing auditors not to treat this is a factor.  
Whether auditors will do so or not is another question, since Auditing Standard No. 2’s 
list of factors is not exhaustive.  More importantly, if compliance is significant to audit 
committee effectiveness, in terms of internal control over financial reporting or more 
                                                 
49 Opacity in PCAOB’s explanation suggests another possible account of its decision to 
delete these items, echoing points noted above (in notes 42 and 45): that PCAOB is a 
component of a broader federalized corporate governance regime managed by the SEC.  
See Part V, infra. 
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generally, this again suggests reasons to consider searching to identify additional or 
alternative providers of audit committee evaluations. 
 
C.  Objective Criteria 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 mentions numerous other factors bearing on auditor 
assessment of audit committee effectiveness in overseeing external financial reporting 
and internal control over financial reporting.  Most of these factors, as well as most audit 
committee activities, are not measurable using objective criteria, a foundation of 
traditional auditing standards.  In fact, many are quite subjective.  
 
 One factor Auditing Standard No. 2 mentions is the clarity boards use in 
articulating the audit committee’s responsibilities and how well managers and committee 
members understand them.50 Measuring linguistic clarity is not easy; teachers measure 
reading comprehension routinely and assign grades based on examinations.  It is unclear 
whether auditors possess objective tools such as examinations—and whether audit 
committee members and managers would sit for them.51 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 states that auditors assess the audit committee’s 
involvement and interaction with the external auditor.  Apart from this metric’s 
circularity and conflict-creation, measuring involvement and interaction is highly 
subjective. PCAOB’s proposed standard spoke of the “level” of these factors, language 
AS No.2 drops.  Though “level” may be no more objectively measurable, at least it hinted 
at some standard.  Auditing Standard No. 2 also deletes illustrations appearing in 
PCAOB’s proposed standard concerning involvement relating to the auditor’s retention, 
appointment and compensation.  No reason for the deletion is provided. 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 also states that auditors assess the audit committee’s 
involvement and interaction with the internal audit team.  The same criticism applies.  
Auditing Standard No. 2 also dropped the proposed standard’s use of the word “level” in 
this context.  Similarly, it deletes illustrations appearing in PCAOB’s proposed standard 
concerning involvement relating to the audit committee’s line of authority and role in 
appointing and compensating internal auditors, also without explanation. 
 
 In Auditing Standard No. 2, PCOAB deleted a catch-all evaluation metric 
appearing in its proposed standard: the amount of time a committee devotes to internal 
                                                 
50 Id. [“the clarity with which the audit committee’s responsibilities are articulated (for 
example, in the audit committee’s charter) and how well the audit committee and 
management understand those responsibilities.”]. 
 
51 No doubt many auditors excel in linguistic clarity and most of Auditing Standard No. 2 
is written clearly, but consider the definition it provides for “significant deficiency,” 
supra note 30 (quoting definition of significant deficiency from Auditing Standard No. 2, 
¶ 9). 
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control issues and the amount of time members “are able” to devote to committee 
activity.  It likewise does not explain why, perhaps because the metric so obviously 
ignores quality of time. By definition, efficient committees spend little time with greater 
effectiveness and inefficient committees spend more time with lesser effectiveness. 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 also adds factors not contained in PCAOB’s proposed 
standard: (1) committee interaction with key members of financial management, 
including the chief officers of finance and accounting; (2) the degree to which difficult 
questions are raised and pursued with management and the auditor, including as to 
critical accounting policies and judgmental accounting estimates; and (3) the committee’s 
responsiveness to issues that an auditor raises.  While likely probative of audit committee 
effectiveness, none of these is measurable using objective criteria that are staples of 
traditional auditing practice and assurance. 
 
 Despite many comment letters on PCAOB’s proposed standard criticizing the 
absence of objective measurement criteria,52 Auditing Standard No. 2 does not come to 
grips with the reality that these factors elude measurement by objective criteria.  This 
does not mean the factors or even subjective testing of them are unimportant or useless.  
It suggests that traditional auditing tools are not well suited to conducting the evaluation. 
 
D.   Liability Risks 
 
 Finally, two issues arise concerning the liability effects of auditor evaluation of 
audit committees.  First, auditors evaluating audit committee effectiveness may expose 
themselves to liability for violation of professional standards.  Suppose an auditor 
evaluates a corporation’s audit committee as effective.  Subsequently a major financial 
fraud is uncovered within the company. Auditors are likely defendants in lawsuits by 
shareholders now armed with an additional liability theory.53 This auditor liability risk 
may unduly raise the requirements auditors insist that audit committees meet before 
drawing a favorable assessment.  This bias would accentuate conflicts of interest. 
 
 Second, auditors evaluating audit committee effectiveness may expose audit 
committee members to liability for violation of fiduciary obligations.  Suppose an auditor 
evaluates a corporation’s audit committee as ineffective.  Whether or not fraud exists 
within the corporation, shareholders are now armed with a theory of liability against 
those directors.54  This audit committee liability risk may unduly lower the requirements 
                                                 
52   See Part IV, infra. 
 
53  In a separate paper, I discuss and analyze liability risks that auditors face under 
Auditing Standard No. 2.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Auditing’s New Early Warning 
System: Theory, Practice and Auditor Liability Risk under PCAOB Auditing Standard 
No. 2 (draft manuscript on file with the author and planned for release on 
www.ssrn.com). 
 
54 Director-liability risk is real for any Delaware corporation lacking charter provisions 
exculpating directors from personal liability for money damages due to breaches of the 
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auditors insist that audit committees meet before drawing a favorable assessment.  This 
bias cannot be counted on to offset the bias created by auditor liability risk.  Taken 
together, the conflicts again compound. 
 
E.  Summary of Limits and Gaps 
 
 To summarize the limits of auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness 
shown by Auditing Standard No. 2: 
 
 ● reports are not disclosed unless ineffectiveness constitutes a material weakness;  
 
 ● evaluations are part of an overall control environment review related to internal  
 control over financial reporting, not a full-scale effectiveness evaluation;  
 
 ● even this partial and non-public method poses conflicts with state corporation  
 law;  
 
 ● it creates conflicts between auditors and audit committees;  
 
 ● auditors must assess legal issues such as independence and cannot assess legal  
 issues such as compliance;  
 
 ● auditors lack objectively measurable criteria; and  
 
 ● liability risks of auditors and audit committees can impair optimal evaluation,  
 compounding conflicts.   
 
 Within these limits, auditors must nevertheless gain some level of assurance as to 
audit committee effectiveness.  Auditors attesting to the veracity of managerial assertions 
concerning internal control over financial reporting, and to financial statement assertions, 
require an understanding of audit committee effectiveness.   
                                                                                                                                                 
duty of care.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003) (authorizing such charter 
provisions). For corporations governed by law based on the Model Business Corporation 
Act the risk is less meaningful.  See ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
2.02(b)(4)(1990) (stronger version of the exculpation authorization, containing no 
reservation for breaches of the duty of loyalty and the limitation concerning intentional 
conduct lacks a good faith alternative).   Even for Delaware corporations boasting such 
charter provisions, director-liability risk is meaningful because charters do not exculpate 
for breaches of the duty of loyalty or intentional conduct.  Lack of independence required 
by SROs as interpreted by auditors can indicate the former and disagreement with 
auditors required to evaluate audit committee effectiveness could indicate the latter.  
Risks include litigation uncertainty arising from judicial treatment of charter exculpations  
as affirmative defenses, putting the burdens of pleading and proof on directors as to good 
faith and absence of duty of loyalty breaches.  See Emerald Partners v. Berlin. 787 A.2d 
85 (Del. 2001). 
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 The issues are (1) whether the gap between what auditors can do and the ideal can 
be filled using additional providers of audit committee effectiveness evaluations and/or 
(2) whether alternative providers should be sought for the entire exercise, both to provide 
assurance to financial statement users and for auditors to rely upon.55  Accordingly, it is 
fruitful to consider other parties to supplement or substitute in this exercise to overcome 
these inherent limits of auditor evaluations of audit committee effectiveness. 
 
 
III. STATE AGENCIES  
  
 To recapitulate the framework of the evolving corporate governance regime: state 
law provides that boards, including through audit committees, manage corporations; SOX 
directs that audit committees oversee auditors, but otherwise imposes no substantive 
duties on or regulatory oversight of audit committees; SROs provide disclosure rules 
related to audit committee responsibilities and performance;56 PCAOB provides a partial, 
limited and non-transparent auditor evaluation of audit committee effectiveness in 
overseeing financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 In this evolving circle of corporate governance, one arc remains to be included: a 
mechanism for a full, public audit committee evaluation by a party other than the board 
of directors.  While not obviously necessary,57 the arc is missing from the circle chiefly 
due to federalism concerns: SOX and the other federal engines (SEC, SROs, PCAOB) 
have not filled it.  Congress could.  For example, it could direct that audit committees be 
evaluated and certified, perhaps by the SEC, PCAOB, or the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO).58   
                                                 
55 See Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶¶ 108-126 (expressly authorizing auditors to rely upon 
the work of others in conducting audit when such other work is competent and objective). 
 
56  SRO listing “standards” specify in excruciating detail how boards of directors are 
obliged to supervise and evaluate audit committee performance, though the basic 
standard is at heart a principle of state corporation law. 
 
57  See Part I, supra.  The issue recalls the famous exchange between Senator Alben 
Barkley and the auditor Colonel Carter during hearings on the original federal securities 
acts: 
 Senator Barkley: “You audit the controller?” 
 Mr. Carter: “Yes, the public accountant audits the controller’s account.” 
 Senator Barkley: “Who audits you?” 
 Mr. Carter: “Our conscience.” 
See Gary John Previts & Barbara Dubis Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United 
States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting (1998), at 457 n. 98. 
 
58  A historical parallel supports both identifying and rejecting the GAO alternative: early 
drafts of the federal securities laws from the 1930s provided that public company audits 
would be performed by the GAO.  In 1945, Congress established the Division of 
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 This is neither likely nor wise.  It is unlikely because when Congress enacted 
SOX, it expended its firepower, acted under the heated light of public fury, and through 
the combination bought all related political rewards. It is unwise because though SOX 
itself essentially merely codifies best practices, those charged with implementing its 
provisions have so heavily extended the tentacles of corporate governance that more 
federal hands on the scale would throw the system even further out of balance than the 
gales following SOX so far have done. 
 
 Private suppliers could be tapped. A corporation could engage a separate external 
auditing firm for this function.  This would ameliorate conflicts, but not expertise 
problems.  Or a corporation could retain an outside law firm.  This would solve expertise 
problems. But lawyers’ interest in other work would pose conflict issues.  Specialty firms 
are unlikely to emerge as major sophisticated providers, given that the service would 
likely produce low profit margins.   Higher-quality providers measured by higher 
opportunity costs would likely not participate.  For all three such alternative providers, 
moreover, liability risks would be significant.  Unless they priced their services at 
premiums equivalent to functional insurers, this market would unlikely become vibrant or 
useful to the public capital markets.59   
 
 Other candidates include rating agencies.  They escape or neutralize some 
problems but pose an additional significant issue.  Certifications will appeal to 
corporations when they lower their cost of capital (by an amount greater than the 
agency’s fee).  Rating agencies provide a service that strongly influences the cost of 
capital.  Accordingly, selling these services to rated clients poses a conflict.  Involving 
rating agencies in internal evaluations of audit committees could also impair the rating 
agency’s objectivity and independence when providing credit rating services.  Finally, the 
fact that rating agencies have not emerged to offer this service suggests a low likelihood 
that they will do so. 
 
A.  Inherent Appeal, and Some Limits 
 
 States can fill the gap. This section outlines how a state agency would overcome 
or neutralize all of the inherent limits associated with an auditor evaluation of audit 
committee effectiveness.  Highlights include: it would be public in terms of disclosure, 
complete, conflict-free, assess legal and compliance issues, be performed using criteria 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corporate Audits within the GAO and mandated that it audit all government 
corporations.  Resulting laws dramatically increased the GAO’s workload.  The GAO 
continues to play an important watchdog function over public company auditors.  See  
Previts & Merino, A History of Accountancy in the United States, supra note 57, at 330-
31, 403 & 410. 
 
59  For the case supporting using insurance markets to address financial fraud risks, see 
Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-
visited, 8 STAN. J. L. & BUS. 39, 48-61 (2002). 
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with which relevant experts are familiar, and eliminate liability risks posed by auditor 
evaluations.  The following explains each point. 
 
 The first two advantages are nearly self-evident.  First, state agencies could 
provide public evaluations of audit committee effectiveness.  Corporations could disclose 
the certifications as part of their public securities filings. Second, the service could 
examine overall committee effectiveness, not just concerning areas related to external 
financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 States may be superior to auditors and other private actors because they are free of 
conflicts these face.  Limiting conflicts is inherent in the concept of a state-chartered 
agency conducting the certification exercise. Both conflicts Auditing Standard No. 2 
poses are neutralized: there is no conflict between the state and its corporation law and no 
conflict between a state agency and boards of directors, audit committees, corporate 
management or auditors.  This would diminish the circumstances in which disagreements 
arise, limiting them to situations in which major concerns about effectiveness exist, not 
quarrels over business or legal judgments.60 
  
 An equally significant advantage is that states have at their disposal the expertise 
and requisite criteria to apply.  Experts in state corporation law would draw on the 
reservoir of fiduciary concepts. These require independence (a duty of loyalty concept) 
and competence, including a measure of financial expertise (duty of care concepts).  They 
encompass the particulars specified in SEC and SRO rules emanating from these bedrock 
concepts, as well as compliance with law. 
 
 Critics hold different interpretations concerning the teeth of modern fiduciary 
duty law, especially as articulated and applied by the Delaware Supreme Court.61  
Traditional fiduciary duty law had teeth.  Current state law applications may be seen as 
lax.  State agency affirmations of audit committee effectiveness based on adherence to 
weak state law principles would not mean very much.   
 
 These points suggest possible virtues of a state-agency approach to audit 
committee evaluations.  Certification could help reinvigorate traditional fiduciary 
                                                 
60 Conflicts could arise depending on how the state agency were funded, a point discussed 
in the next section. 
 
61  As one example among many split views on Delaware Supreme Court opinions, 
consider continuing critical appraisals of its landmark decision holding directors 
personally liable for breach of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985): some call it a “legal disaster” while others champion it as the “apogee” of 
judicial excellence.  Compare, e.g., Fred S. McCheseny, A Bird in the Hand and Liability 
in the Bush: Why Van Gorkum Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. L. REV. 631 (2002) with 
Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkum’s Legacy: The Limits of 
Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. L. 
REV. 579 (2002).  
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obligation. If so, state agencies reviewing the relationship of their laws to audit 
committee effectiveness could facilitate development of state law more congruent with 
standards necessary to make audit committees effective.  This could not only invigorate 
competition among states for optimal governance arrangements, but an internal 
competition within states towards the same end.62 In addition, state corporation law’s 
fiduciary obligations, including independence and competence (loyalty and care), are 
standards-based.  This provides an attractive alternative to the dense rule-bound approach 
that invariably emanates from federal sources, including SROs, as well as from 
accounting and auditing standard setters, including PCAOB.63 
 
 A major upside to a state agency approach to audit committee evaluation is 
liability risk limitation.  State agencies attesting to audit committee effectiveness can be 
designed to enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity, for both the agency and its 
employees.  An agency’s certification would not expose it to liability in the event of 
subsequent financial frauds at the corporation.  The result is to eliminate liability risks 
from the tasks of the agency and the audit committee. 
 
 Nor should agency certifications carry any legal significance in subsequent 
litigation concerning a company, its board of directors, audit committee or shareholders.  
Positive certifications should not be available to insulate boards or committees from 
liability and negative certifications should not provide a basis to support shareholder 
claims of director breach of fiduciary duty or other liability.  In each case, however, 
courts could admit related evidence when deemed appropriate under judicial notice 
concepts.64  These provisions would likewise eliminate liability risks from the tasks of the 
agency and the audit committee. 
 
 A final advantage to the state agency approach is that the agency could also 
experiment with a variety of designations.  These can include a pass-fail assessment to 
more refined gradations.   A refined scale would offer more valuable information to the 
user community and provide superior feedback to audit committees on their 
effectiveness.65 
                                                 
62 Probabilities here depend on which of several rival theories of corporation law 
production one holds, discussed in Part V, infra. 
 
63 See Chandler & Strine, The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance 
System, supra note 4; see also supra note 47. 
 
64  So using judicial notice concepts would enable judges to draw upon knowledge 
developed by the state agency as to what constitutes effective audit committees.  This 
could enhance the quality of fiduciary duty law judges articulate, without turning the 
device itself into a liability-determining mechanism. 
 
65 PCAOB expresses a more modest goal, necessary by virtue of inherent limits on what 
auditors can do in the exercise. See Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E67 (the goal is 
not to “grade the effectiveness of the audit committee along a scale” but to detect any 
audit committee ineffectiveness for purposes of the auditor’s overall control evaluation). 
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 The advantage of a graded scale, on the other hand, implicates complex 
measurement challenges.  State agencies interested in providing graded evaluations 
would need to develop adequate criteria by which to provide them.  This raises a related 
and broader question they would need to answer: what constitutes audit committee 
effectiveness.  This can vary with contexts, corporations and committees. Officials would 
need to recognize this informed by an appreciation of fiduciary law principles embracing 
this reality.66  Officials would also need to understand that the audit committee is an 
element of the overall corporate governance system of which board-effectiveness is 
likewise a key element.  Evaluating and certifying this broad functionality may be 
difficult. 
 
 Finally, there may be areas where auditors are in a better position than state 
agency officials to evaluate aspects of audit committee effectiveness.  These may relate to 
technical aspects concerning internal control over financial reporting.  State agency 
officials would need to develop an understanding of these areas or themselves rely upon 
auditors for assistance in their evaluation.  Whether one or the other of such evaluations 
is adequate would require investigation; if each contributes unique expertise both may be 
necessary and each would rely upon the other to complete respective assignments.67  
Advantages to the state agency approach remain in affording this additional assurance 
auditors cannot provide.  
  
B.  Implementation 
 
 From the states’ viewpoint, a key attraction of a state-agency audit committee 
evaluation program is to create and/or leverage a brand name.  Whether one agrees or 
disagrees with the structure and content of state corporation law or particular cases, states 
command legal expertise, especially as to concepts of independence, loyalty, competence 
and governance.  Delaware has a brand name that attracts corporate chartering business to 
the state; Nevada appears interested in creating one; the larger states with more in-state 
corporations and a rich corporate law tradition also boast a brand name in the corporate 
world, including California and New York.   
 
 States adopting the concept would signal interest in developing the gold standard 
in corporate governance.  The signal is superior to any similar signals the judiciary could 
offer through enhanced fiduciary enforcement, for example, since judges only resolve 
cases and controversies after-the-fact, not general corporate governance matters ex ante.  
Exploiting this opportunity by creating a state agency to provide audit committee 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
66  For “ten rules for really effective audit committees” offered by a corporate lawyer, see 
John F. Olson, How to Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097, 
1106-12 (1999). 
 
67 Cf. Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶¶ 108-126 (expressly authorizing auditors to rely upon 
the work of others in conducting audit when such other work is competent and objective). 
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evaluations and certifications entails facing design and administration issues, the outlines 
of which are sketched as follows. 
 
 Organization and Authorization. The agency could be created as part of an 
existing arm of state government or a newly-created agency.68  It could be part of the 
executive or legislative branches of state government, but should be separate from the 
judicial branches (to protect against the use of agency certifications in subsequent 
litigation).  To enjoy sovereign immunity, the agency should be created as part of the 
state, rather than any political sub-division.  The agency could be created either by act of 
the governor or through particular legislation.69  Ideally, the agency would be designed to 
maximize insulation from political pressures.   
 
 Staffing and Training.  Relevant experts within a state include active and retired 
lawyers, judges and academics.  These experts could be appointed to the agency in the 
same manner as other state officials or judges.  Or alternative appointment mechanisms 
could be devised, such as the governor appointing officials directly with or without 
approval of the state legislature.  Some experts may opt for this role rather than going on 
the bench. Limited additional training would be necessary (as to internal control over 
financial reporting perhaps), though members would undoubtedly continue to maintain 
their expertise through formal and informal educational pursuits such as reading relevant 
literature and attending relevant conferences.  States could also experiment with 
outsourcing portions of the exercises using professional organizations that match experts 
with assignments.70 
 
 Certifications and Designations.  Corporation codes could be amended to require 
or make optional a periodic audit committee evaluation and public certification. A range 
of certifications could result depending on the scope of the related evaluation, from 
simple compliance to overall effectiveness. Corporations could disclose the certifications 
in any forum they wished, including as part of their public securities filings.  
 
 Optional Approach Suggested. Whether to make it optional or mandatory requires 
deliberation.  While this choice should be left to individual states, there is a strong case 
                                                 
68 In Delaware, this task could be assigned to the existing Division of Corporations within 
the Department of State, or a newly-created corporations auditing office. 
 
69   In Delaware, the process of amending the state corporation law is straightforward, 
managed virtually entirely by the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar 
Association.  See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History 
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885 (1990). 
 
70  E.g., GEMinfo.org & Round Table Group (www.roundtablegroup.com). This approach 
may be valuable to address the start-up costs associated with developing new agencies.  It 
would also provide resources to the state agency when demand for services periodically 
spikes, as it may at the program’s outset and during periods of unusually high investor 
anxiety. 
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for the optional approach given absence of a compelling systemic need for the 
certification.71  If optional, corporations would decide on frequency; if mandatory, states 
would specify whether it should be done annually, bi-annually, tri-annually, or perhaps at 
different frequencies for corporations of different size, complexity and financial-reporting 
track records.72  If made optional, two categories of domestic corporations could be 
designated, one for those opting in and one for those opting out.  In Delaware, for 
example, corporations could describe themselves as a “Delaware corporation” for those 
opting out; and a “certified Delaware corporation” for those opting in.   
 
 Extending to Out-of-State Corporations.  States could offer this service for 
locally-chartered corporations and could even offer it for corporations chartered 
elsewhere.  So extending the service offers the advantage of enhancing competition 
among states, with the partial disadvantage of requiring experts in one state’s corporation 
law to become expert in another (there is so little variation across states that this should 
be of limited significance).  If offering the service to out-of-state corporations, these 
could be authorized to use the designation in a similar way to in-state corporations.  A 
California corporation opting for the Delaware certification, for example, could describe 
itself as a “Delaware-certified California corporation.”73 
 
 Self-Funding.  The agency could generate funds from those corporations using its 
certification service.  Pricing of services could be proportional to SOX’s public company 
accounting support fee, given work required and information being generated and 
conveyed.  It would certainly be a small fraction of those fees and likewise a small 
fraction of ongoing audit costs (especially now that they have risen significantly).74  
Pricing could be in part a function of the agency’s expenses. The largest agency expenses 
would likely be for salaries and office space.  Travel expenses could be charged to 
corporations using the service.   
                                                 
71   See Part I, supra. 
 
72  Unlike the SEC or SROs, states also could offer this product to all corporations, not 
just those with registered and/or listed securities.  Appeal for widespread use is suggested 
by proliferation of SOX-type governance practices among various non-SEC registrants (a 
phenomenon known as “Sarbinization”).  E.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 
WWW.SSRN.COM (March 11, 2004). 
 
73  Some may find such designations confusing, at first.  But nearly all complex novelties 
are confusing, at first.  E.g., ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970). 
 
74 See FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 
IMPLEMENTATION (Jan. 2004) [survey of 321 companies of various sizes shows that 
under SOX (a) on average annual costs rise $1,322,200 ($590,100 for internal control 
audits and $732,100 for new systems) and (b) for companies with revenues exceeding $5 
billion, average annual costs rise $6.2 million ($4.7 million for new internal control 
audits, $1.5 million for new systems)]. 
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 Supplemental Budgets.  The agency need not be self-sustaining from service fees 
it generates.  A portion of the state budget funded by corporation franchise fees could be 
allocated to underwrite the agency’s budget.  This would be a prudent budgetary measure 
to the extent the certification becomes a signal of a states’ interest in the most effective 
audit committees and corporate governance generally.  States offering the service to 
domestic and foreign corporations could offer a discount for domestic corporations, a 
device to lure additional chartering business to the state and offset such supplemental 
budgeting.  
 
 Funding Conflicts.  A potential conflict arises when corporations pay a state to 
provide this service, however, on grounds of regulatory capture.  There is no complete 
way around such conflicts.  A way to minimize it in this context is to provide 
shareholders a voice in making the decision whether to use the service.  After all, the 
service would be primarily for their benefit. Alternative tools to facilitate shareholder 
voice on the subject include state law voting mechanisms such as charter opt-ins or opt-
outs and/or federal proxy mechanisms providing for more pro-active shareholder 
proposals on the subject. 
 
 Other Factors.  This is not an exhaustive catalogue of relevant features of a state 
agency audit committee evaluation function.  It outlines key features.  States would be 
entitled and encouraged to experiment with variations on these and other features.  The 
possibility of variations on these themes and particular models would induce competition 
among the states.  Corporations, acting through their boards of directors and audit 
committees, would consider which programs, if any, offer the best product in terms of 
signaling credibility to the market and towards minimizing the corporation’s cost of 
capital. 75   
 
 
IV. ANTICIPATING SUPPORTING CONSENSUS FROM THE FIELD 
 
 Comments offered publicly on PCAOB’s Proposed Standard provide a strong 
basis for inferring that the state-agency approach would garner substantial support from a 
wide variety of constituencies, including users, producers and professionals.76   
                                                 
75 For data on the relationship between certain corporate governance features and 
ratings—and hence the cost of capital—see Hollis S. Ashbaugh, Daniel W. Collins & 
Ryan Z. Lafond, The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms’ Credit Ratings, 
SSRN.com (March 2004).  The researchers find that credit ratings are unaffected by audit 
committee member independence, are positively related to board independence and 
negatively related to CEO power over the board. Audit committee certifications would 
provide more refined information to rate credit quality and possibly improve credit 
ratings and reduce the cost of capital. 
 
76 PCAOB recorded 194 comment letters on its proposed standard leading to Auditing 
Standard No. 2, all available using PCAOB’s Web site, www.pcaobus.org (click 
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A.  Users and Producers 
 
 Several comments on behalf of investors and other financial statement users 
supported PCAOB’s proposed standard in concept, though recognizing the difficulty 
auditors face in discharging the assignment.77 They emphasized the need for an 
independent review, which excludes auditors.  Suggestions included that boards of 
directors hire specialists from another CPA firm or from a non-CPA firm.78 
 
 Not all investor groups supported PCAOB’s Proposed Standard.79 The California 
State Teachers’ Retirement System emphasized conflicts, limited auditor competencies 
and existing sources of supervision and information.  Even it, however, concluded by 
suggesting that “PCAOB may want to review the charters and opine on the audit 
committee’s diligence in mitigating risks to the public.” 80  
 
 A residual user concern focused on the importance of auditors understanding 
audit committee effectiveness.  Absent such testing, one said, it would be “wrong and 
misleading to investors” for an auditor to report that it has assessed effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting without assessing the audit committee.81  This 
can be solved, however, by providing an independent and competent review upon which 
auditors can rely.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rulemaking to link to PCAOB Docket, number 8). Aside from a handful of polemical 
screeds, the letters are thoughtful analyses providing numerous perspectives, some 60 of 
which are cited in the following discussion by letter number in the PCAOB docket. 
 
77 These included the Commonwealth of Virginia; CalPERS; the AFL-CIO; Ohio 
Retirement Systems; and Glass, Lewis & Co. 
 
78 Despite these qualifications, PCAOB asserted in explanations accompanying Auditing 
Standard No. 2 that “investors supported the provision.”  Auditing Standard No. 2, App. 
E, ¶ E63. 
 
79 This is contrary to PCAOB’s assertion in explanations accompanying Auditing 
Standard No. 2 that “investors supported the provision.”  Id. 
 
80 Comment Letter to PCAOB from California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 58).   
 
81   Comment Letter to PCAOB from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 184).  Glass Lewis is an independent proxy and financial 
research firm that provides research to institutional investors.  Id.  Its letter is signed by 
Lynn E. Turner, former SEC Chief Accountant. 
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 Issuer comment letters nearly unanimously recognized the need for effective audit 
committees, while generally opposing having auditors perform the evaluation.82  Only a 
few issuer comment letters supported using the auditor to perform this task, noting 
conflicts.83  Another hinted at the state agency possibility: that the evaluation be done “on 
a periodic basis by a party other than the external auditor.”84   
 
 The vast majority of issuers opposing PCAOB’s proposed standard’s auditor 
evaluation of the audit committee cited SOX § 301 as conflicting with Auditing Standard 
No. 285 (some of these also cited conflicts with SRO rules requiring boards to conduct 
                                                 
82  Collective expressions of corporate America’s opinions sounded themes similar to 
those particular corporations offered and summarized here. E.g., Comment Letter to 
PCAOB from Business Roundtable (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 181) 
(concept is “particularly inappropriate” given SOX § 301 and SRO listing standards).  
Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of corporations with a 
combined work-force of more than 10 million US employees and $3.7 trillion in annual 
revenues.  Id. 
 
83 Comment Letters to PCAOB from United Technologies Corporation (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 46); Chittendon Corp. (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 34); Kimball International (PCAOB Letter Nos. 2 & 38); and 
Crowe Chizek and Company, LLC (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 168). 
 
84 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Instruments Incorporated (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114). 
 
85 E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from BP plc (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 47); Pfizer Inc.  (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 69); Eli Lily 
and Company (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 75); Boise Cascade 
Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 81); Commercial Federal 
Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 87); Empire District 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 97); Southern Union Company (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 98); EnCana  Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 111); Texas Instruments Incorporated (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114); E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 115); Edison Electric Institute (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 117); Cummins Inc. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket 
No. 8, Letter No. 123); Irwin Financial Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 125); EMS companies (Solecdtron, Flextronics, Celestica and Sanmina-SCI) 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 130); Sun Life Financial Inc. (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 134); Jefferson Wells International (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 135); Bank of America (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 145); Computer Sciences Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 151); Motorola, Inc. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 154); and BellSouth Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 
162). 
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audit committee evaluations).86 Many emphasized that audit committee effectiveness is a 
board of directors’ responsibility,87 questioned whether auditors possess requisite 
expertise, and noted that SROs are addressing the subject.  Issuer comment letters that 
suggested tying the need to the board of directors returns the question to state doorsteps.  
On balance, therefore, the issuer community would likely support the state agency 
concept.  If made optional, some would likely opt for it. 
 
 Few directors offered comments on PCAOB’s proposed standard; those 
commenting said little concerning specifics of auditor evaluation of audit committee 
effectiveness.  In general, however, one could expect directors to prefer a state agency 
approach rooted in common law principles.  There is nothing new in these concepts.  
They are also standards-based and include the business judgment rule. This contrasts with 
the auditor’s professional skepticism that would lead to second-guessing and PCAOB’s 
heavily rule-based approach that suffocates business judgment.88  While not possible to 
predict every director’s opinion, it seems reasonable to expect that a critical mass would 
support it.89   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
86  E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Commercial Federal Corporation (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 87); E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 115); and Bank of America (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 145). 
 
87 E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 62); EnCana Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 111); and Yellow Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket 
No. 8, Letter No. 146). 
 
88   Numerous comment letters criticized PCAOB proposal as exceedingly dense and 
rule-bound.  E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68) (“overly rigid, technical 
rules,” and encouraging “more principles-based and less rigid” approach); Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 102) (“gives the impression of trying to achieve, and having an overall expectation 
of, ‘perfection’”, and evincing a “stifling bureaucracy”); Irwin Financial Corporation 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 125) (“overly prescriptive and rigid”);  
ATT Corp. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 85) (“overly prescriptive”); 
Boise Cascade Corporation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 81) (“too 
prescriptive and detailed”); Manufacturers’ Alliance/MAPI (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket 
No. 8, Letter No. 99) (“Unnecessarily prescriptive”); and Prof. Dennis R. Beresford 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 21) (“overkill”). 
 
89 Comments from consultants to boards furnish support.  One proposed to overcome 
inherent limitations of auditor evaluations by suggesting that audit committee evaluation 
be done by a “third party approved by shareholders, in a separate evaluation. Comment 
Letter to PCAOB from Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 127). 
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B.  The Auditing Profession 
 
 Auditing’s Big Four firms90 generally opposed PCAOB’s proposed standard 
requiring auditor evaluations of audit committees, but not because it lacks a certain 
appeal.91  Deloitte and PWC sympathized, in principle, but held deep reservations as to 
implementation; KPMG and E&Y made the practical objections more explicit.  All 
accepted that audit committee effectiveness is an important component of the control 
environment, but only a component and therefore not warranting separate auditor 
evaluation.  PWC emphasized that the board of directors is responsible for audit 
committee effectiveness; E&Y observed that internal control should function without 
audit committee involvement; and Deloitte recognized that many see the audit committee 
as outside the scope of internal control over financial reporting. 
 
 Deloitte and KPMG both expressed concern about evaluation capabilities given 
that auditors lack full, complete, unfettered access to audit committee members, meetings 
and information.  E&Y identified the following areas where it believes auditors are 
capable of evaluation using objective criteria:  clarity of responsibility articulation; 
assessing the committee’s management approach to designing, implementing, and 
monitoring internal control over financial reporting; and whether it reacts to 
management’s failure to respond to deficiencies.  KMPG disagreed concerning whether 
auditors have these and other capabilities, noting in particular that it is not clear how 
auditors would assess member understanding of duties or the significance of time 
devoted.   
 
 All the Big Four singled out areas clearly beyond their capabilities or competence.  
Leading this list are those involving legal determinations like independence and listing 
standard compliance.  Deloitte characterized testing compliance with listing standards 
under SOX § 301 as testing for compliance with laws/regulations, outside the scope of 
internal control over financial reporting.  It also indicated the lack of auditor capability in 
evaluating whether the audit committee nominating process was independent. KPMG 
opined that compliance with listing standards under SOX § 301 or concerning ACFE 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
90  The firms and the number of their letters in PCAOB’s comment-letter docket are 
Deloitte & Touche LLP (71); Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y) (144); KPMG LLP (91); and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC) (82). 
 
91 This view is contrary to PCAOB’s assertion in explanations accompanying Auditing 
Standard No. 2 that auditors “were generally supportive” although they sought clarity that 
the evaluation was “not a separate and distinct evaluation” but “one element” of the 
auditor’s overall understanding and that auditors would have difficulty given lack of total 
access.  Auditing Standard No. 2, App. E, ¶ E64. 
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under SOX § 407 are legal interpretations and regulatory compliance outside the scope of 
reliable financial reporting.92  
 
 Auditing’s three mid-sized firms93 offered opinions similar to the Big Four.  BDO 
Seidman also emphasized that because corporate governance—not just the audit 
committee—is a critical component of the control environment, board effectiveness is 
critical.  It also cautioned against having auditors provide implicit assurance on audit 
committee effectiveness.94  Grant Thornton added that effective audit committees are not 
necessary to effective internal control over financial reporting and effective oversight is 
not sufficient for effective internal control over financial reporting.  McGladrey & Pullen 
expressed greater optimism, opining that legal compliance matters aside, auditors possess 
objectivity and technical competence to judge audit committee effectiveness, but wanted 
the duty limited to “consideration of observable information and behavior.” 
 
 The AICPA substantially replicated comments of the Big Four.95 An Illinois 
group was divided, though even supporters noted that auditors face a “difficult task” in 
evaluation, including as to legal and regulatory compliance.96  A Texas group favored it, 
admitting that the audit committee’s power over the auditor may deter objective 
assessment, but noting that ineffective audit committees can cause significant problems.97  
A New York group noted conflicts and competency issues, but again paving the way 
toward a state approach concluded that this task should be performed by the board of 
                                                 
92  Deloitte and KPMG both suggested that if the concept is retained, then management’s 
report would also need to assess audit committee effectiveness.  Deloitte cited for support 
SOX § 407’s requirement that boards determine whether to have an ACFE and listing 
standards that require boards to perform annual audit committee assessments.  KPMG 
concurred (as did the mid-sized auditing firm, McGladrey & Pullen, LLP), adding that 
auditors should be permitted to rely upon management’s assessment in preparing their 
own evaluation.  The Big Four also all agreed that the listed factors need refinement.   
 
93 The firms and the number of their letters in PCAOB’s comment-letter docket are BDO 
Seidman, LLP (136); Grant Thornton LLP (101); and McGladrey & Pullen, LLP (142). 
 
94 BDO Seidman was the only major accounting firm to cite SOX § 301’s directive as 
driving a conflict between the audit committee and the auditor and hindering 
communication, the dominant points offered by nearly every issuer comment letter and 
many others.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 
95 Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 105). 
 
96 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Audit and Assurance Services Committee of the 
Illinois CPA Society (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 103). 
 
97 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 78). 
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directors, the SEC or “some other body that is not in the employ of the audit 
committee.”98  One professional auditors’ group believed the proposal is appropriate, but 
required more guidance;99 another took the opposite position, urging its deletion.100  The 
latter cited the litany of factors posing inherent limits, all of which would be neutralized 
by the state agency concept.   
 
 International associations of accountants expressed reservations, drawing on 
learning that likewise points towards a state solution.  The largest group of international 
accountants observed that it is a difficult question: in theory, auditors cannot perform this 
task; in practice, someone must perform it; and on balance, the optimal solution is to 
require auditors to perform an evaluation linked narrowly to their assessment of the 
overall control environment.101  A UK accountancy group noted that the UK Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance requires boards to conduct performance evaluations of 
audit committees.102  A European group emphasized the need to address the conflict, not 
shrink from it, suggesting using a threats-safeguards approach similar to that of the IFAC 
Ethics Code which would involve requesting an “independent colleague (review partner) 
to assist.”103 
 
 Among accounting academics, the leading group, the American Accounting 
Association (AAA), opined: “one radical and perhaps cost-prohibitive suggestion is to 
require a second audit firm to perform the audit committee assessment on a less frequent 
basis (e.g., every 3-5 years).”  As noted at the beginning of this Part, this would solve the 
problem of independence, but not of expertise.  It indicates, however, a willingness that 
should lead the AAA to support the state agency approach—a willingness likewise 
                                                 
98  Comment Letter to PCAOB from New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 140). 
 
99 Comment Letter to PCAOB from National State Auditors Association (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 113). 
 
100 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institute of Internal Auditors (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 112). 
 
101Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 88).  The Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants boasts that it is the world’s largest professional association of 
accountants.  Id. 
 
102 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 102). 
 
103 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 79). 
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strongly indicated by substantially all the other comment letters the auditing profession 
provided to the PCAOB on its proposed standard, as summarized above. 
 
C. The Legal Profession 
 
 The American Bar Association (ABA) concluded that PCAOB’s proposed 
standard was “not consistent with” SOX § 301104  and “appear[ed] flawed and circular.”  
Beyond these general fatal flaws, the ABA identified three more negotiable flaws: many 
requirements are beyond an auditor’s expertise or are better handled by others; are not 
measurable by objective criteria; or require legal judgments.   
 
 The Association of the Bar of the City New York reported similar objections to 
PCAOB’s proposed standard, and also objected on the grounds that the listed evaluation 
factors “would require a much greater degree of involvement by the auditors in the 
internal operation of the audit committee” and observation requiring skills beyond auditor 
expertise, including knowledge of listing standards and interpretations.105 The New York 
State Bar Association expressed similar concerns, citing both independence-impairment 
when auditors perform this essentially managerial function and questioned whether 
auditors are in a good position to carry out the duties.106   
 
 No other bar association commented on PCAOB’s proposed standard, though an 
informed guess suggests that most would concur with the views expressed by the ABA 
and the two New York associations.  On the other hand, certain bar associations might 
have more specific concerns, including for example the Delaware State Bar Association, 
whose expertise in corporation law and corporate governance may equip and incline it to 
provide more detailed insights.  In any event, if the comments these bar associations 
provided are representative, it is reasonable to infer that the legal profession as a body 
would support the state agency concept.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Bar Association, Section of Business Law 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 185). 
 
105 Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
Committee on Financial Reporting (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68). 
 
106 Comment Letter to PCAOB from New York State Bar Association, Business Law 
Section, Committee on Securities Regulation (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 180). The American Society of Corporate Secretaries echoed the points, also 
emphasizing how the SROs are addressing the questions. Comment Letter to PCAOB 
from American Society of Corporate Secretaries, PCAOB Sub-Committee of the ASCS 
Securities Law Committee (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 106). 
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V.  ANTICIPATING REGULATORY HESITATION 
 
 Despite predicting likely support for the state agency concept from users and 
preparers of financial statements and from the auditing and legal professions, it is 
uncertain whether regulators or states would support it.  These predictions can be 
informed by evaluating the overall prevailing framework of corporate governance and 
alternative models of how its components are produced.  The current array is dominantly 
federal, with states residing in the background, a relationship that tends to support 
predicting federal regulatory hesitation and state reluctance or indifference.  But there 
may be hope. 
 
A.  Federal 
 
 Generations of corporate law scholars have debated whether state corporation law 
is a product of horizontal competition among the states and, if so, whether the 
competitive output showed a race to the top, to the bottom or to somewhere else.107  As 
the intellectual and empirical debate stalemates on this horizontal competition among 
states, an alternative sees a vertical competition between federal securities regulation and 
state corporate law, with the federal hand dominant but still limited.108  In this story, 
SROs either (a) fill a gap between federal and state corporate governance sources or (b) 
operate as an extension of the federal regulatory hand into territory better reached 
through superficially-private means or where federal courts would not allow federal 
administrative agencies to venture.109   
 
 Recent debates concerning SROs resemble the hoary corporate law debate in 
asking whether competition among SROs, plus foreign securities exchanges, are running 
                                                 
107  Debate dates to the 1930s, led by Justice Brandeis and Professors Berle and Means, 
continued through the 1970s in a noted exchange between SEC Chairman Cary and Judge 
Winter, and endured through the 1990s and today with scores of articles devoted to 
numerous aspects of the subject.  For representative positions, see ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW (1993) (top); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992) (bottom); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (lawyer and investment banker interest groups); William W. 
Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L. REV. 401 
(1994). 
 
108   E.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 488 (2003); Jones, 
Rethinking Corporate Federalism, supra note 8. 
 
109  See Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance, supra note 4. 
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a horizontal race of their own, and whether this is to the top or bottom.110  Similar debate 
concerns competition among other regulatory bodies, such as accounting standard-setters 
like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) versus the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
 
 With PCAOB’s creation a similar conversation is likely concerning its obvious 
competitors such as the International Auditing Standards Board.  To the extent PCAOB 
also engages in standard-setting that affects corporate governance, however, a new 
conception of horizontal competition emerges: PCAOB can compete with states and 
SROs.  PCAOB’s product market is less clear than Delaware’s (charters for franchise 
fees) or the SROs (listings for listing fees).  But power to set the agenda and to control 
the processes of standard-setting may be intrinsically valuable, and despite SOX’s effort 
to insulate PCAOB from the auditing profession, rents may remain available that PCAOB 
could have a major role in allocating.111 
 
 In the case of evaluating audit committees, which body should set the agenda and 
specify required elements: the SEC, SROs, PCAOB or states?  The SEC may fear direct 
efforts to do this would extend beyond the power Congress granted it in SOX (or, more 
precisely, that a federal court might accept this argument);112 it may recognize that using 
SROs would be impracticable given their distance from the operational activities of audit 
committees; by default or design, PCAOB fills the bill.   
 
 Some evidence from the evolution of PCAOB’s proposed standard into Auditing 
Standard No. 2 suggests that PCAOB is operating as a component of a more general 
federal-based corporate governance system.113  Whether the SEC would want the states to 
do this is unclear. Some evidence suggests that federal regulators disfavor competition 
among SROs;114 if so, they may likewise object to horizontal competition by states 
against these SEC instrumentalities. 
 
 Indulging a naïve perspective, however, if federal regulators were acting in the 
best interests of the nation, they would welcome the state agency approach to audit 
committee certification as well.  Congress, the SEC and the SROs exhibited some 
federalism restraint in their provisions concerning audit committees: all reposed 
                                                 
110  E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?  The Impact of Cross-Listings and 
Stock Market Competition on Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002). 
 
111  See Bratton, Rules Versus Standards Versus Rents, supra note 21. 
 
112  E.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 
113  See supra notes 42, 45 and 49 (discussing Auditing Standard No. 2’s deletion of 
factors appearing in PCAOB’s Proposed Standard concerning independence of audit 
committee nomination and selection process and compliance while retaining factor of 
member independence). 
 
114  See Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance, supra note 4. 
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substantial power in boards to review effectiveness and imposed disclosure requirements. 
PCAOB offers enhanced review by auditors, but is clearly aware of inherent limitations.  
None of these groups offers the solution best suited to the task.   
 
 Returning to federal regulators’ self-interest, assigning this function to states 
would relieve these regulators of the particular associated burdens, while leaving them in 
a position to monitor the concept in action.  The SEC operates using a restricted budget, 
after all, and must appeal to Congress to secure funding for its activities.  When facing 
budget constraints, the SEC may prefer additional funds to support its enforcement 
activities rather than to develop or support new initiatives such as audit committee 
certification.   
 
Permitting states a meaningful role in corporate governance offers the SEC 
another advantage.  When systems fail and public protests ensue, federal regulators can 
point to the states for laxity in fiduciary standards or other weaknesses. The states are 
thus also useful to Congress as scapegoats for scandal. So Congress may be willing to 
encourage the SEC to support a state-agency approach to audit committee certifications.   
 
 In fact, this view may explain what are otherwise SOX’s half-measures.  That is, 
why not preempt state corporation law for public companies, subjecting directors and 
audit committees to federal corporation law standards and review? Though complex 
political and legal explanations arise, a simple and plausible explanation is this: maybe 
the half-steps reflect knowledge that no regulatory regime is capable of preventing 
fraudulent shenanigans and regulatory laxity like that of the late 1990s and early 2000s.   
 
 Leaving the state hole enables the federal apparatus to point to state laxity when 
the next wave of corporate malfeasance is revealed. If federalization of corporate 
governance were made complete today, then when the next scandal appears there would 
be no one but the federal apparatus to blame.  Under this view, states as a whole have an 
incentive to participate in reshaping corporate governance with the same visibility and 
commitment the federal engines have exhibited. Whether individual states have requisite 
incentives is considered next. 
 
B.  States 
 
 Estimating the likelihood that particular states would pursue the state-agency 
audit committee certification product depends on a theory of state corporation law 
production.  The traditional models—race to the bottom or top or an interest group 
model—offer ready predictions.  If a race to the bottom best explains state corporation 
law production, states are unlikely to support the concept to the extent it imposes 
discipline and transparency on management.  If a race to the top or an interest group 
model, then states are likely to embrace the concept.  They would embrace the concept 
under the race to the top to the extent it lowers the cost of capital by reducing agency 
costs and serves the interests of capital markets and investors.  They would embrace it 
under the interest group theory to the extent it produces additional revenue for states and 
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their lawyers, keeping services in the legal profession and out of the auditing and 
accounting professions. 
 
 Predictions of state inclination are more difficult if one embraces the two 
variations on the model, which appear increasingly more capacious and accurate 
descriptions of the observed federalization of corporate governance production. Under 
the vertical competition model, states only act when pressured and the federal machinery 
can nearly always directly or indirectly preempt them.  The only way to prevent this is to 
fall into line; the state-agency concept would constitute an innovation rather than a 
capitulation.  Under the disguised-federalization model, states may have a role, but may 
lack incentives to play it.  A limited incentive is to genuinely compete with the federal 
apparatus in standard-setting leadership, but the federal hand is so powerful that this 
would require unusual political fortitude.  
 
 Within some states, such political skill might exist.  States are not necessarily 
monolithic.  They are political institutions populated by people holding differing views.  
Within a state, some lawyers and judges may favor the concept while others oppose it.  
Supporters could recognize that using a state agency along with the judiciary could cause 
a friendly internal competition as the state’s standard-bearer.  If the state agency achieved 
a degree of national recognition as a thought and practice leader in good corporate 
governance, within the boundaries afforded by state corporation law, this could 
incrementally induce superior judicial decision-making as well.  States could compete 
with the federal apparatus in a real vertical competition amounting to a race to the top—
when next season’s scandals hit states could blame the federal machinery. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2’s emphasis on audit committee effectiveness returns 
federal law’s ambitions for audit committees to the foundation, to state corporation law 
from which directors get their power and duties. The federal return to state corporation 
law leaves an incomplete and possibly incoherent corporate governance system.  The 
incompleteness is epitomized by the federal emphasis on audit committee effectiveness 
and the lack of a mechanism—state, federal or private—to provide requisite assurance.   
  
 The example and analysis underscores the limits of half-measures. If the federal 
approach leaves open such an obvious hole in the framework, then it is just as deficient as 
the state corporation law it purports to correct.  Either the federal regime must be 
complete and fully preempt state corporation law or states must be given incentives and 
space to participate in developing corporate governance.  Congressional reticence against 
complete preemption of state corporation law suggests need to give states space, 
incentives and support to contribute meaningfully to improving corporate governance. 
 
 State-agency audit committee certifications provide a vehicle for state 
contributions.  The concept would form a logical part of a complex—and unplanned—
regulatory model of corporate governance production.  It would embrace an emerging 
horizontal competition among different types of competitors, invigorate vertical 
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competition between state and federal producers, reinvigorate interstate competition and 
ignite intrastate competition.  Getting these processes rolling would require only a single 
state to move first.  Getting a state to move would probably require lobbying by the 
private-sector leaders likely to be supportive, including financial statement users and 
preparers as well as the auditing and legal professions. 
